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PUBLIC CORRUPTION CONCERNS AND COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY DEFINITION IN CITIZENS UNITED
V FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
DAARON KIMMEL*

Whom ought we to distrust, if not those to whom is committed great

authority, with great temptations to abuse it?
- Jeremy Bentham I

Second Decade of the 21st Century.
Corporations Rule.
- Opening lines of the bleak sci-fi film, Johnny Mnemonic 2

INTRODUCTION
In Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned two of its own cases on a 5-4 vote, striking down parts of
the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act to allow corporations
to directly spend treasury funds on electioneering communications in the
days leading up to federal elections. 3 The Court actively swung the First
Amendment as a sledgehammer against long-standing campaign finance
regulations and previously settled precedent, and then fell back on the
argument that its actions were demanded by the Constitution itself. The
case features lengthy and widely divergent majority and dissenting
opinions, and has sparked widespread, intense public debate and
controversy in the legal community.
Professor Lori Ringhand coined the term "democracy-defining
dilemma" in a 2004 article while critiquing the Supreme Court's campaign

* J.D. candidate at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, expected May 2012. The author would
like to thank his wife Amanda for her seemingly inexhaustible patience and support. Many thanks to
faculty advisor Mark D. Rosen as well as Christopher W. Schmidt, Kent Streseman, and Katharine K.
Baker for their helpful comments on several drafts of this paper.
1. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 314 (1843).
2. JOHNNY MNEMONIC (TriStar Pictures 1995).

3. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
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finance jurisprudence. 4 She argued that in determining the shape of the free
speech rights and anti-corruption concerns that courts evaluate in these
cases, judges are influenced by their own underlying understandings of
what an ideal democracy should look like. 5 This happens because judges
must rely on some baseline definition of democracy to determine if a
government attempt to shape democratic processes is constitutionally
appropriate: one must know what "good" looks like to be able to determine
what counts as "bad." 6 Campaign finance cases are somewhat unique in
this respect because in these cases, the government is seeking to directly
regulate the political process itself.7 Thus, for judges to decide whether the
government is appropriately regulating the political process, the rules that
allow all citizens to interact with and shape their democracy, judges must
first decide what that democracy ought to look like.8
This Note applies Professor Ringhand's democracy definition
framework to the Citizens United decision and argues that this case is a
particularly bold judicial attempt to redefine the processes of American
democracy. The majority effectively substituted its own political
preferences for those of Congress by invoking First Amendment language
as a proxy for an underlying argument on the structure of American
democracy: that corporations should have many of the same political rights
as people. 9 But this shift will create some serious problems if the Court's
vision of democracy differs too much from the vision held by most
everyone else.
Part I of this Note explains why campaign finance cases are uniquely
relevant for the democracy definition problem and outlines two general
theories of democracy that closely track the campaign finance debate:
pluralism and civic republicanism. It then summarizes the Court's
historical balancing of anti-corruption and free speech concerns in
campaign finance cases. It also lays out the democracy definition
framework, showing how these concepts implicitly depend on the Justices'
underlying understanding of what an ideal democracy should look like,
4. Lori Ringhand, Defining Democracy: The Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 77, 77 (2004). Lori Ringhand is a professor of law at the University of Georgia. She has
written numerous articles on judicial activism, confirmation hearings, and constitutional law.
5. Id. at 90.
6. Id
7. Id. at 87.
8. Id
9. The scope of this Note does not include many of the practical implications of granting
corporate personhood for political purposes under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, "A
Corporation has no Soul"-Modern Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the
PoliticalProcess, 47 HOus. L. REv. 617 (2010).
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which explains the wide swings in logic and outcomes between campaign
finance cases over time. Justices have waged a hidden policy debate
through these cases over how best to structure our society; this debate
deserves to see the light of day, and properly belongs to the people's
elected representatives in Congress, not the Court.
Part II of this Note critiques the Citizens United decision as a
particularly overt and heavy-handed exercise in defining democracy. The
Court invoked difficult-to-define concepts like free speech and corruption
in such an abstract and broad way as to render them almost meaningless,
and then applied them as if by an exacting formula to achieve a desired
result.' 0 The Court's constitutional analysis stems not from clear,
externally-established meanings for these general concepts, but from the
majority Justices' underlying vision of democracy. The Constitution does
not necessarily prevent the legislature from experimenting with anticorruption legislation like that struck down in Citizens United.11 Instead,
the five majority Justices have acted on their own initiative,1 2 with a
sweeping lack of deference to Congress and past Court decisions.
Finally, Part III of this Note contrasts the Citizen United majority's
narrow anti-corruption rationale with the public's seemingly broader
corruption concerns. Specifically, many Americans appear to lump together
more things under the mantle of "corruption" than just classic issues of
acute corruption like bribery. They also include democratic process issues,
like whether the system has been captured by special influence money and
control so that their own voices are excluded from effective democratic
participation-a concern over institutional capture, or institutional
"corruption." This broader understanding of corruption conflicts with both
the Citizens United majority's jaundiced view of the corruption interest in
its constitutional analysis and with the outcome that corporations should be
able to spend unlimited amounts of money to influence elections.
This distinction may explain what appears to be the general
unpopularity of the Citizens United case, which could signal both a popular
disagreement with the Court over the holding and a more fundamental
parting of ways over underlying values of democracy. Also, while
campaign finance law after Citizens United has a dwindling ability to
prevent these broader types of corruption from occurring in the first place,
attempts to prosecute such abuses after the fact offer even less hope of
10.
Election
I1.
12.

Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United v. Federal
Commission, 42 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 311-312 (2011).
Ringhand, supra note 4, at 79.
See id
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success;13 and in allowing corporations to spend unlimited funds to directly
influence elections, the Court risks escalating problems of institutional
integrity by further eroding public trust in representative government.
I. BACKGROUND
This part of the Note explains why campaign finance cases are
uniquely relevant to democracy definition and lays out the general pluralist
and civic republican theories of democracy. It then provides a thumbnail
sketch of the relevant campaign finance cases leading up to Citizens
United. And it explains the basic framework of the democracy definition
argument and argues that because of this underlying democracy-definition
issue, courts should be more deferential to legislative attempts to
experiment with campaign finance regulation.
A. Theories ofDemocracy and Unique Relevance of Campaign Finance
Cases
In campaign finance cases, judges have the power not only to shape
our society through the effect of their decisions, but also to change the
ground rules by which all citizens are able to participate in and mold their
democracy themselves. 14 If popular sovereignty is to mean anything, the
procedural rules by which a democracy operates and evolves over time
must correspond to the will of the people at least as much as the substantive
laws it produces.15 But in resolving conflicts in campaign finance cases,
judges must implicitly rely on their own internal baseline visions of what
an ideal democracy should look like, because "the rights the judiciary is
charged with protecting cannot themselves be defined (and thereby
protected) without judicial reliance on some underlying vision of what
democracy itself should look like." 1 6 This creates a real dilemma,
especially when these underlying-yet determinative-definitions of
democracy remain hidden. 17
To assist in this analysis, it may be helpful to define two general
theories of democracy up front. Although there are many theories of
democracy, and many more internal divisions within them, pluralism and
13. See Jonathan L. Entin, Responding to Political Corruption:Some InstitutionalConsiderations,
42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 255 (2011).
14. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 116-17 (2003).
15. See JUSTICE STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 33-34 (2005).

16. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 79.
17. Id. at 80.
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civic republicanism roughly match the democracy arguments on each side
of the campaign finance debate.' 8 Pluralists argue that democracy is
essentially one big, rough-and-tumble battle between interest groups.19 In
their view, people band together and compete to elect sympathetic officials
and lobby them to pass their legislation. Elected officials should listen to
the chorus of voices and make decisions based on observing the tug-ofwars and compromises hashed out between different groups. Pluralists do
not necessarily believe in "fairness" or consensus: policy is just whatever
comes out of the messy political process. They are generally against
campaign finance regulation because it makes it more difficult for interest
groups to gain influence, though limited regulation may be acceptable to
curb the worst abuses of the system.
On the other hand, civic republicans reject this interest group focus
and instead view democracy as a way for people to achieve consensus on
important issues through open, reasoned debate. 20 The political process
should serve as a search for truth that results in the implementation of the
best available policies. They see interest groups themselves as a corruption
of the system, because by creating blocks of political power that may
influence and consistently capture politicians' votes, such groups distort the
ideal political process and distract from reasoned debate on the issues. As
we shall see, aspects of these two theories of democracy appear throughout
the Supreme Court's campaign finance cases.
B. CorruptionConcerns in CampaignFinance Cases
The Supreme Court developed its current framework for evaluating
the constitutionality of campaign finance legislation in its 1976 Buckley v.
Valeo decision. 2 1 In evaluating a First Amendment challenge to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court balanced free speech
concerns on the one hand against the need to prevent "corruption or the
appearance of corruption" caused by the pervasive effects of large amounts
of money being injected into federal elections. 22 As part of its finding that
corruption extended beyond bribery to "undue influence on an
officeholder's judgment," the Court noted that:

18. Id. at 82 n.28.
19.

See generally ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-44 (1956).

20. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-56
(1988).
21.

424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).

22. Id. at 25.

270

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1

Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse .... [T]he
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also critical . . . if

confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent.' 23
The Court upheld the majority of the Federal Election Campaign Act's
regulations on the basis of these anti-corruption concerns, including
restrictions on direct contributions to candidates and disclosure
requirements. 24 But the Court struck down a section regulating independent
expenditures; in doing so it argued that these presented less of a risk for
creating corruption or the appearance of corruption due to their likely
uncoordinated nature. 2 5 The Court would later narrow this somewhat by
endorsing restrictions on "independent" expenditures that were explicitly
coordinated with a candidate, noting that they are the "functional
equivalent" of direct contributions to candidates. 26
The Federal Election Campaign Act and the Buckley decision certainly
ushered in a new era for campaign finance law in general in the 1970's. But
by that time Congress had already been banning corporations from
participating in elections for many years. While FECA did include
restrictions on corporate electioneering, these sections merely updated
older laws: Congress had been banning corporations from making direct
contributions in federal elections since 1907 under the Tillman Act, 27 and
from making independent expenditures since 1947 under the Taft-Hartley
Act. 28 The Supreme Court declined to overturn the Taft-Hartley corporate
expenditure ban on First Amendment challenges in 194829 and again in
1957.30 The Court did not address these issues of corporate electioneering
in the Buckley decision 3' because this was all settled law by 1976. This is
important to remember, because as we shall see, the Citizens United Court
23. Id. at 26-27 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)) (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 35-37.
25. Id. at 39.
26. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446, 447
(2001) [hereinafter Colorado II] (noting that "coordinated expenditures are as usefil to the candidate as
cash, and ... such 'disguised contributions' might be given 'as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate' (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)).
27. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(2006)).
28. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Although its passage was mostly driven by
concerns over electioneering by unions, Taft-Hartley applied to both union and corporate expenditures.
29. U.S. v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 113, 123-24 (1948).
30. U.S. v. Int'l Union, 352 U.S. 567, 590, 592-93 (1957).
31. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010) ("Buckley did not
consider § 6 10's separate ban on corporate and union independent expenditures . . .").
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relied heavily on Buckley to overturn the longstanding ban on corporate
electioneering.
Corruption looms large in campaign finance cases. But the concept of
corruption is difficult to define in isolation, and the Court's expression of
its meaning has varied a great deal from case to case, depending on which
Justices supported each opinion. 32 Thankfully, a discernable pattern has
emerged over time. There are three distinct standards of corruption that
appear in the cases following Buckley, although they have sometimes
blurred together. 33 These types of corruption standards can be called the
monetary influence, distortion, and quid pro quo rationales. 34 While the
quid pro quo rationale involves only explicit bribes of money for political
acts, the monetary influence rationale goes beyond this to include more
implicit ways in which money corrupts the political process. 35 Finally, the
distortion rationale specifically addresses the ability of corporations as
artificial legal entities to amass and utilize large amounts of money to
influence elections without any connection to popular support for targeted
political goals. 36
1. The Monetary Interest Rationale
In Buckley, the Court discussed quid pro quo corruption on the one
hand, but also held that the anti-corruption interest went beyond explicit
acts of bribery to more general ideas of improper influence and the
appearance of corruption. 37 Then in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, the Court referenced the monetary interest rationale more directly
while creating an exception to the general rule against corporate
electioneering to allow corporations to influence a state referendum.3 8 The
Court distinguished referenda from elections by noting that unlike in an
election, there is no candidate in a referendum to be corrupted by a
corporation's spending. The Court described this type of corruption as "the
creation of political debts," 39 an explicit use of the monetary influence
rationale. The Court further noted that this corporate spending exception
for referenda should in no way detract from the general "importance of the
32. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When
Public Opinion Determines ConstitutionalLaw, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 126-27 (2004).
33. Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976) (per curiam).
38. 435 U.S. 765, 790, 795 (1978).
39. Id. at 788 n.26.
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governmental interest in preventing" the creation of political debts through
corporate spending on candidate elections. 40 As discussed in Part II of this
Note, Citizens United heavily relied on Bellotti for the principle that
corporations have broad First Amendment rights. This is a fairly ironic
reading of the case because the Court was merely creating an exception to
the rule, not arguing against the rule itself; the Bellotti exception did not
change underlying concerns about the ability of corporate money to corrupt
political candidates.
The Court has described the monetary influence rationale as targeting
"a subversion of the political process," where "[e]lected officials are
influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of
financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns." 4 1
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court clarified that in talking about
corruption, it was concerned with threats of "improper influence and
opportunities for abuse in addition to quid pro quo arrangements." 42 And
later the Court reaffirmed that "corruption [is] understood not only as quid
pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment, and the appearance of such influence." 4 3
2. The Distortion Rationale
The Court dealt specifically with the distortion rationale in Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 44 holding that
non-profit advocacy groups were exempt from the general ban on corporate
electioneering. 45 The Court distinguished these groups from normal
corporations on the basis that profit-seeking corporations can distort the
political process through their build-up of wealth because the method of
acquiring wealth is normally unconnected to political goals. 46
On the other hand, the fact that non-profit advocacy groups fundraise
expressly for political purposes minimizes any distortion effect in their
political use of that money. 47 For example, people do not generally buy
coffee at Starbucks to support its political goals; however, they do donate
money to the Southern Poverty Law Center to support its political agenda.
40. Id.
41. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985).
42. 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) [hereinafter Shrink Mo.] (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. ColoradoII, 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
44. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
45. Id at 259.
46. Id
47. Id
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The corporation is a legal fiction created by state power, a fiction that
allows for the rapid accumulation of capital. The state may choose to limit
some of its political rights because individuals are not putting capital into a
corporation for political purposes. 48
The Court then invoked the distortion rationale even more strongly in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, where it upheld a state law
banning independent expenditures by for-profit corporations. 49 Writing the
majority opinion, Justice Marshall described this type of corruption as "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."50
Austin is one of the two cases that the Court overturned in Citizens
United.5'
3. The Quid Pro Quo Rationale
In the other such case, McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, a
fractured Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act. 52 Congress passed this legislation to
restrict the burgeoning influence of "soft" money (unlimited contributions
made to political parties to avoid limits on direct candidate contributions)
in federal elections and to require candidate-specific political advertising to
be paid for by "hard" money (direct contributions to candidates) in the days
before a primary or election. 53 The Court split several ways in this case,
with Justices Stevens and O'Connor invoking the monetary interest
rationale in their plurality decision while delivering the opinion of the
Court. 54
On the contrary, the dissent argued that the corruption rational was
limited only to explicit bribery-like quid pro quo arrangements. The
plurality noted that the Buckley Court had explicitly rejected the dissenting
justices' argument that the corruption rationale was limited to bribery-like

48. Id.
49. 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
50. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
51. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
52. 540 U.S. 93, 188-89 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
53. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26. Use of the unregulated "soft" money loophole sprang up in
response to FECA's restrictions on the amount of "hard" money that could be directly donated to
candidates, and thus was not yet an issue at the time of the Buckley Court's review of that statute.
Congress attempted to close this loophole by passing BCRA.
54. Id at 143.
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quid pro quo arrangements. 55 Instead, Buckley stated that anti-bribery laws
"deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence government action."5 6 And the plurality argued that if
the Court prevented Congress from acting on the undue influence rationale,
"the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." 57 The
McConnell plurality showed a great deal of deference to both Congress's
judgment in identifying the most corrupting types of political spending and
its ability to experiment with creative solutions to eliminate that
corruption.5 8
C. Underlying Democracy DefinitionIssues
The power of judicial review is an awesome one, and courts must
wield it carefully and deliberately, for their decisions can have drastic longterm effects on our society. 59 Courts should be especially careful in
evaluating campaign finance issues because their decisions help set the
rules by which everyone is able to participate in and shape our
democracy. 60 In campaign finance cases, important definitions of speech
rights and corruption in campaign finance cases are inextricably connected.
Through their decisions in these cases over the years, judges have actually
been carrying on an implicit debate over the proper dimensions of our
democracy.
1. Speech Rights and Anti-Corruption Concerns are Dependent Variables
Before engaging in a balancing test between speech rights and
corruption concerns to decide a campaign finance issue under the Buckley
framework, judges must first define the contours of these two vague
ideas. 61 The very nature of this process, however, requiring them to balance
a vague speech concept against a vague corruption concept, allows judges
an enormous amount of leeway to make a decision. 62 Further complicating
matters, the ideas of speech and corruption are inextricably linked with one
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Although the holding of McConnell is no longer good law after Citizens United, the words of
Justices Stevens and O'Connor here are still useful in interpreting other surviving case law.
57. Id. at 144 (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 377, 290 (2000) (emphasis omitted)).
58. Id. at 154-58.
59. BREYER, supra note 15, at 41.
60. See id at 46-47.
61. Burke, supra note 33, at 127-28.
62. Teachout, supra note 10, at 322-23.
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another by definition: Buckley essentially asks judges to draw a line on a
continuum at which acts that would be speech become corrupt non-speech,
and thus speech is bounded as non-corruption and corruption as nonspeech. 63
Determining the scope of such rights and countervailing restrictions
requires a judge to rely on an underlying vision of what democracy should
look like in order to figure out where to draw the line. 64 After all, "the right
to free speech derives from the nature of democracy itself." 65 The nature of
the judge's view of an ideal democracy can account for wildly different
outcomes in this process. Because a judge must both define the concepts of
speech and corruption and weigh them against one another at the same
time, this "mak[es] for tricky weighing and tricky defining." 66 But it is the
judge's underlying view of democracy that drives each of these choices,
which allows the judge a great deal of discretion to arrive at a preferred
outcome.
2. Judges Have Held an Implicit Democracy Debate in Campaign Finance
Law
An ongoing democracy debate has long simmered beneath the surface
of the Supreme Court's campaign finance cases. As Professor Ringhand
noted, the Buckley corruption-based campaign finance framework has
allowed Supreme Court Justices to contest fundamental democratic process
issues by proxy. The debate shifts to a rights protection issue, even though
the true arguments are about democracy. 67 This is problematic because
while American society has conducted an open and ongoing debate over
the details of our democracy since the Founding-and a healthy, functional
democracy should always include such a debate-the underlying
democracy arguments in campaign finance law have been hidden away. 6 8
Instead of conducting an open debate on these important issues, "judges ...
63. Id. at 324.
64. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 90; see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 802-04 (1985) (discussing the difficulties of
defining "corruption" without resorting to some contextual baseline comparison); Burke, supranote 33,
at 128 ("When corruption is proclaimed in political life it presumes some ideal state. Corruption is thus
a loaded term: you cannot call something corrupt without an implicit reference to some ideal. In order
to employ the concept of corruption in the context of a political controversy, such as that over campaign
finance, one must have some underlying notion of the pure, original or natural state of the body
politic.").
65. Matthew Michael Calabria, Remembering Democracy in the Debate Over Election Reform, 58
DUKE L.J. 827, 842 (2009).
66. Teachout, supranote 10, at 323.
67. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 80.
68. Id.
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have been able to rest important decisions on unchallenged definitions of
democracy that in fact are deeply contested and controversial." 6 9 By using
such techniques judges may be able to force their own democratic
prejudices onto society through judicial fiat, even though legislators may
have never before debated those ideas or debated and rejected them
outright.
For example, the logic of Buckley itself seems to be based on a rather
pluralistic, interest group-focused vision of democracy. The Court's
decisions on two questions in Buckley demonstrate this pluralistic tilt: (1)
determining the validity of the proposed government interests; and (2)
setting the standard of review and weighing the interest against competing
First Amendment concerns for each specific restriction. 70 The Court
rejected the Government's asserted interest in promoting political
equality-which accords more closely with republican ideals of fairness,
reasoned debate, and consensus building-as insufficient to offset speech
concerns. 7 1 But it upheld the Government's asserted interest in preventing
political corruption. 72 In applying the corruption interest, the Court found
that regulation of direct contributions merited a lower standard of review
because such contributions carry a significant risk of corruption. 73 Then, in
evaluating the regulation of independent expenditures, the Court found that
the highest standard of review was required; in the Court's view in 1976,
independent expenditures simply did not present much of a risk of
corruption because the threat at that time came from direct contributions. 74
The Court then struck down the restriction on independent expenditures
while upholding the one on direct contributions. 7 5
So the Court's decision of which standard of review to apply to a
regulation-and thus whether it would likely survive review-was based
on both how it defined corruption and how it applied that definition to the
factual circumstances at hand. But this choice also illuminates the Court's
underlying view of democracy as a pluralist theory. 76 Pluralists support
upholding contribution limits because they serve to prevent the worst
abuses and keep the system running, and they oppose restrictions on
independent expenditures because they restrict more robust interest group
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 39.
Id at 29.
Id. at 35-39.
Id.
Id.
Ringhand, supra note 4, at 82.
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competition. 77 Similarly, the Court's first decision in Buckley-upholding
the corruption interest but not the equality interest-also resolved a debate
between pluralist and civic republican arguments in favor of a pluralist
outcome. 78 And in making an odd constitutional distinction between
Congress's ability to regulate contributions and expenditures, the Court
defied the original logic and goals of Congress in creating the Federal
Election Campaign Act and has created a seemingly arbitrary regulatory
system that commentators have long ridiculed. 79 Although majorities of
Justices have since supported overturning Buckley's illogical framework of
review, they have consistently been divided by the question of what should
take its place. 80
The result has been a fractured and sometimes inconsistent body of
campaign finance cases, with a host of different definitions of corruption
and free speech. 8 1 However, there is a deeper problem at work here. As
Professor Ringhand argued, "judicial reliance on unstated, disputed and
often shifting assumptions about democracy" has been the real source of
the messiness and unpredictability of the Supreme Court's campaign
finance jurisprudence. 82
3. Need for Deference to Congress on Campaign Finance Issues
Judges should be more deferential to Congress on campaign finance
issues, and not just in cases where they agree with the policies that have
been enacted. In light of the instability and arbitrary outcomes inherent in
submerging this democracy definition problem in rights-based language,
judges should be more explicit in discussing their underlying assumptions
on these issues. 83 As Professor Ringhand recommended, judges should
simply delve down to the core problem in campaign finance cases by
asking whether "the definition of democracy the Court is relying on in
defining the constitutional right at issue mandated by the
Constitution ... ."84 Where this is not the case, courts should be more
deferential to congressional experimentation-and not simply in cases
where the majority of justices agree with the legislative outcome, because
that is no real solution. It is important that judges recognize their limits in
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Samuel Issacharoff,On PoliticalCorruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 119 (2010).
Id at 120.
Persily & Lammie, supranote 32, at 127.
Ringhand, supranote 4, at 80.
Id.
Id.
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this area of law so that it is the people's representatives who are
deliberating over the details of their democratic processes, with more
transparency and accountability.8 5
But Congress and state legislatures need more freedom to experiment
on campaign finance issues. The open messiness of a democracy is also one
of its great strength, but people need to believe in the overall system for it
to work correctly. 86 Congress can more fully distill and respond to the will
of the people on these issues than can the courts. 87 In part this is because
democratic governments provide "institutional conduits for distrust,"
allowing for open public deliberation of issues and ongoing accountability
of elected officials so that people may trust the system even if they do not
necessarily trust individual actors.8 8
In addition, congressional representatives are themselves substantive
experts on campaign finance law-it's something they must understand
well to continue winning elections. 89 They are intimately familiar with the
risks of campaign corruption and the effectiveness and need for different
types of regulations in ways others will never understand. 90 In this vein,
Justice Breyer argued in Shrink Missouri that "the legislature understands
the problem-the threat to electoral integrity, the need for
democratization-better than do we" members of the Court. 9 1 Therefore, as
Professor Ringhand argued, we should strive to "ensure that a judge will
not lightly or without justification substitute his or her own preferred vision
of democracy for that preferred by the legislature," so long as "the
definition of democracy pursued by the legislature is not [itself]
constitutionally prohibited." 92
II. CITIZENS UNITED: DEMOCRACY DEFINITION RUN AMOK
This part provides a nuts-and-bolts summary of the Citizens United
decision and analyzes it under the democracy definition framework
outlined above. It argues that in Citizens United, the Court made a
dramatic, internally inconsistent attempt to change the rules of campaign
finance law-thus reshaping our democracy-and that this should be cause
85. Id. at 112.
86. Mark E. Warren, Is Low Trust in Democratic Institutions a Problem of Corruption?, in
CORRUPTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 37, 53 (Michael A. Genovese et al., eds., 2010).
87. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
88. Warren, supranote 86, at 53.
89. Teachout, supranote 10, at 325-26.
90. Id. at 318.
91. Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
92. Ringhand, supra note 4, at 113.
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for concern. Beyond the immediate impact of Citizens United in
overturning the ban on corporate independent expenditures in elections,
courts are already struggling to reconcile the decision with surviving
campaign finance law; if courts follow the spirit of this decision to its
logical conclusion, more changes may be on the way.
A. Overview of the Decision
The Citizens United Court held that corporations and unions are free
to engage in unlimited electioneering communications in the days leading
up to a primary or general election with funds taken directly from their
general treasuries. 93 In doing so, the majority explicitly overturned its own
precedent in Austin and McConnell.94 In overturning McConnell and
invalidating a portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, the
majority disregarded the monetary interest rationale, stating that the
government's recognized valid interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption only extends to explicit quid pro quo corruption. 95
It then held that this narrow anti-corruption interest was insufficient to
overcome the speech rights at stake. 9 6 In overturning Austin, the Court also
dismissed the distortion rationale and argued that due to its reliance on
"ancient First Amendment principles, . . . stare decisis does not compel the
continued acceptance ofAustin." 97
The majority mostly relied on two cases to reach this result. The Court
used selected passages from Bellotti to trumpet the broad First Amendment
rights of corporations to engage in electioneering practices. 98 This is
strange, considering that the explicit logic of that case was that corporate
influence in a referendum could be distinguished from influence in an
election simply because there is no candidate to be corrupted in a
referendum. 99 The Bellotti Court even said outright that preventing
corporations from exerting monetary influence over normal elections was a
valid government interest. 100
93. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 909-10.
96. Id. at 908-09
97. Id. at 886.
98. Id. at 904.
99. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).
100. Id.; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The case on which the majority places even greater weight
than Buckley, however, is Bellotti, claiming it 'could not have been clearer' that Bellotti's holding
forbade distinctions between corporate and individual expenditures. . . . The Court's reliance is odd.
The only thing about Bellotti that could not have been clearer is that it declined to adopt the majority's
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The Citizens United majority also argued that when the landmark
1976 Buckley decision "identified a sufficiently important governmental
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption."'o It stated that the Court
had never upheld limits on independent expenditures, unlike contribution
limits.1 02 The majority went so far as to cite as proof of the harmlessness of
independent expenditures that McConnell's extensive 10,000 page
congressional record "does not have any direct examples of votes being
exchanged for ... expenditures," 03 even though corporate expenditures
had been banned since 1947, making any such evidence quite hard to come
by.104 And the majority boldly stated that even if independent expenditures
lead to greater influence over politicians, "[i]ngratiation and access, in any
event, are not corruption." 0 5 This phrase provides a good illustration of the
majority's absolutism here: there is no sliding scale for corruption, no
context involved whatsoever. For these Justices, more implicit issues of
privileged access and institutional capture simply do not qualify as
corruption.
Furthermore, the dissent expressed concern that people will lose faith
in the system.10 6 The majority argued in response that because the people
"have the ultimate influence over elected officials," it makes no sense that
people will lose interest in engaging with "democratic governance" once
corporations can begin directly influencing elections. 0 7 This sort of
brazen, cavalier statement succinctly captures the majority's disconnect
from the reality of American politics. In the end, the majority decided that
its narrowly-drawn corruption interest did not outweigh its broadly-created
corporate speech right. 1os The majority Justices flatly stated that "we now
conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of

position.... [In fact,] the opinion squarely disavowed the proposition for which the majority cites it."
(citations omitted)).
101. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (majority) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93, 296-298 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. at 909.
103. Id. at 910.
104. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208
(1992) (plurality) (pointing out how hard it can be to find evidence to reaffirm a long-enforced law).
105. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (majority).
106. Id at 931, 962-63 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
107. Id at910 (majority).
108. Id. at 909.
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corruption."l 09 This is another great example of the majority's sense ofabsolutism in defining the corruption interest narrowly.
Writing for the four-Justice minority in a lengthy dissent, Justice
Stevens offered a passionate rebuke of the majority opinion:
In the end, the Court's rejection of Austin and McConnell comes down to
nothing more than its disagreement with their results. Virtually every one
of its arguments was made and rejected in those cases, and the majority
opinion is essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents. The only
relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the
composition of this Court.1 10
Justice Stevens argued in defense of the monetary influence and
distortion rationales, noting that the Court had repeatedly "recognized
Congress' [sic] legitimate interest in preventing the money that is spent on
elections from exerting an 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment'
and from creating 'the appearance of such influence,' beyond the sphere of
quidpro quo relationships." 11

The dissent went on to argue that "[c]orruption can take many
forms... and operates along a spectrum," 1 l2 noting that some other types
of corruption can do much more damage to society than the occasional,
explicit bribe. 113 And while bribery may be the ultimate example of
corruption, it is not so functionally different from more implicit abuses like
buying access. 1 14 Sadly, the understanding of corruption adopted by the
Court will "leave lawmakers impotent to address all but the most discrete
abuses.""l5 The dissent attempted to ground its discussion of the corruption
rationales in terms of political realities, while noting that in contrast, "the
majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo arrangements can be neatly
demarcated from other improper influences does not accord with the theory
or reality of politics."11 6 Furthermore, the dissent argued that where freespending corporations appear to have gained undue influence over elected
officials, voters lose faith in the electoral system, as shown "both in
opinion polls, and in the laws ... representatives have passed, and [judges]
have no basis for elevating their own optimism into a tenet of constitutional
law." 117
109.
110.
in part).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. (majority).
Id. at 941-42 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
Id.at961.
Id.
Id at 962.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962
Id. at 961.
Id. at 963 n.64.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

282

[Vol 87:1

B. BlatantDemocracy Definition by The Citizens United Majority
This section applies Professor Ringhand's democracy definition
framework to the Citizens United decision. First, the majority outlined
speech rights and corruption concerns at the most abstract level possible
and then applied its own fuzzy rules with seemingly formulaic precision to
achieve its desired result. In addition, the majority's relies on "ancient First
Amendment principles" to do much of the heavy lifting in the opinion, in
part to distract from its own role in forcing this outcome. Finally, the
majority showed an extreme lack of deference to both Congress and the
Court's own institutional history.
1. Concepts Defined in the Abstract and Applied as if by an Exacting
Formula
When analyzing a constitutional challenge to a law through the
Buckley corruption framework, judges enjoy an enormous amount of
discretion to put a thumb on the scales of justice both in defining the
speech and corruption concepts and in weighing them against one another.
The best way to abuse this process then, is to define the terms in the
abstract as much as possible, providing little context to ground your
definitions in reality. And once a judge has defined one concept more
broadly than the other, the weighing step becomes relatively simple. But
taking this approach too far hurts the court's credibility and creates difficult
precedent for other courts to follow.
The Citizens United majority dealt with the concepts of corruption and
corporate speech rights at their most abstract level.118 This technique of
abstract generalization made it easier for the Court to limit the meaning of
speech rights for
while broadening
anti-corruption concerns
9
corporations.1
It also reduced the complexity of asserting a
straightforward outcome from the constitutional balancing test: such broad
speech rights easily trump narrowly-drawn anti-corruption concerns.1 20 But
this imagined clear division between speech and corruption does not
correspond with reality.121
In treating corruption concerns so generally, the majority seems to
think that context and real world explanations are irrelevant because
118.

Teachout, supra note 10, at 298.
119. See Ringhand, supranote 4, at 90-91.
120. See id at 91.
121. Teachout, supra note 10, at 324.
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suddenly "the categories of corruption and not corruption, and quid pro quo
corruption and not quid pro quo corruption, are relatively clear."l 22 Yet to
achieve meaningful constitutional analysis, courts must embrace and
explain the context and detailed facts supporting their decisions.1 23 In fact,
the Citizens United majority opinion reads very much like Justice Scalia's
dissent in McConnell, where he flatly stated that given the "premises of
democracy, . . . there is no such thing as too much speech." 24 But this sort
of extreme abstraction is so general that it becomes essentially meaningless
for any judge attempting to decide a case. 125 Indeed, the Citizens United
majority could probably have taken a more fact-intensive approach, at least
attempting to define the important concepts it worked with, and still
reached the same end result.126 This more reasonable approach would at
least have provided more guidance for lower courts going forward. Instead,
such an empty effort to describe the real-life bounds of corruption, an
important policy issue to the American public, hurts the Court's credibility
and creates an amorphous precedent for lower courts to follow.12 7
Additionally, Justice Scalia's and Justice Kennedy's shared belief in
the maxim that there can never be too much speech is also inconsistent;
both summarily agree that speech can be regulated, as it was in Buckley, to
prevent certain types of corruption or the appearance of corruption.1 28 And
yet that distinction makes no sense as constitutional logic.1 29 Why can
speech ever be regulated as corruption, ever become non-speech, if there
can never be such a thing as too much speech? This is what happens when
courts endow essentially political arguments with the power of
constitutional interpretation.' 30 Besides the fact that the majority wanted it
that way, there appears to be no answer as to why McConnell, Austin, and
one set of congressional regulations must fall under the weight of this
generality and yet Buckley and another set of congressional regulations
should remain standing.
This logical inconsistency is the product of invoking such abstract
concepts so broadly, without providing any context in which to place them,
122. Id. at 298.
123. Id at 299.
124. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
125. Ringhand, supranote 4, at 106.
126. Teachout, supra note 10, at 321.
127. Id. at 298-99.
128. See Ringhand, supranote 4, at 106.
129. Id. at 107.
130. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution,NEW YORK TIMES, April 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/opinion/I4stone.html.
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so that they break down in application.131 The majority never explained
"the constitutionally significant distinction" it created between different
types of campaign finance regulations.132 Instead, Justice Kennedy merely
picked his friends out of the crowd, invoking Buckley as gospel-like
binding precedent, while sweeping aside disfavored precedents, Austin and
McConnell, under the power of these seemingly indiscriminate
generalizations.1 33 Justice Kennedy operated in the Citizens United
majority just as Justice Scalia did before him in the McConnell dissent. As
Professor Ringhand noted in critiquing that Scalia opinion:
[H]e simply uses his baseline assumptions about the nature of democracy
to define the scope of the First Amendment, and then argues that the
First Amendment itself therefore requires his definition of democracy. At
no point does he explain why his preferred definition of democracy is
constitutionally compelled but other visions-including the vision
preferred by Congress in enacting BCRA-are constitutionally
prohibited.1 34

In Citizens United, the majority's underlying viewpoint on the nature
of an ideal democracy similarly drives the opinion and First Amendment
language gives useful cover to what would otherwise be naked political

preferences.
Furthermore, the majority's decision to formalize political questions
as if they were easy-to-manipulate math equations turns the whole opinion
into a theoretical game.' 35 But this treatment of the issues is too easy, too
simple; and because it cuts so many logical corners in refusing to define

corruption in real-world terms, it seems insincere. In fact, "[c]orruption is a
concept that is similar to other concepts we hold very close---e.g., liberty,
democracy, or equality-that are extremely difficult to demarcate."1

36

These types of concepts can neither be understood in the abstract, nor
applied like mathematical equations, and yet the Citizens United majority
does both with its treatment of speech rights and the anti-corruption
interest.
2. The Constitution Compels This: "Ancient First Amendment Principles"
The majority actively invoked the First Amendment to overrule
certain long-standing campaign finance regulations and previously settled
cases, and then fell back on the argument that its actions were demanded by
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See Ringhand, supra note 4, at 107.
Id.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
Ringhand, supranote 4, at 107.
Teachout, supra note 10, at 311.
Id. at 326.
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the Constitution itself. In fact, the argument Justice Kennedy invokes for
the majority has become common sentiment for those opposed to campaign
finance regulations: it is the Constitution itself that compels striking down
regulations on corporate electioneering as unconstitutional, not underlying
assumptions about the proper nature of democracy.1 37 The argument often
continues that courts should only be considered activist when they strike
down statutes "without a firm constitutional basis for doing so."l38 Put
another way, "it [is]n't activism if one [is] striking down the right laws."l 39
But this argument is inherently circular in nature, allowing
conservative activists to pretend that their preferred understanding of the
First Amendment is demanded by the Constitution, while still bemoaning
liberal opinions as judicial activism. 140 Thus, conservative activist judges
can force their political views on the rest of society despite signs from the
democratic process that much of society holds a different view on both the
First Amendment and the nature of an ideal democracy. Perhaps this type
of logic would make more sense and not merely provide cover for
underlying democracy arguments "if the Constitution itself somehow
'chooses' a substantive vision of democracy."1 41 But of course the
Constitution was created with a wise balance of pluralist and civic
republican theories, and neither side has been able to gain an advantage in
claiming otherwise. 142
Moreover, it is important to see that it is the process of how we shape
our democracy that matters, not the end result that is achieved. The broader
point is not that one theory of democracy is superior to another; instead the
key is to understand "that defining democracy is what the entire debate is
about."l 43 Continuing to allow one side or the other to constitutionalize
their democratic prejudices in deciding campaign finance cases would
simply put off the reckoning that judges are not working with fixed,
quantifiable rules to arrive at predestined outcomes, but are instead

137. See Ringhand, supranote 4, at 89.
138. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 344 (2009) (quoting KECK, MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 8 (2004) (attributing

the sentiment to Justices Scalia and Thomas)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 345 ("The problem with this definition of judicial activism [is] that it [is] entirely
contingent on one's point of view[;] ... [o]ne person's judicial activist is another person's faithful
interpreter." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141. Ringhand, supranote 4, at 91.
142. Id. at 92.
143. Id.
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allowing their own beliefs on democracy to determine issues that should
properly be decided by open societal debate. 144
The Citizens United decision has generated a great deal of popular
criticism.145 In response to ongoing attacks on the decision, some of those
coming to the Court's defense have fallen back on the familiar argument of
compelled constitutional agency.1 46 They argue that in confronting the First
Amendment basis of the ruling, some critics "dealt with that uncomfortable
reality by simply ignoring what the opinion said."' 47 However, while there
is a great deal to debate with respect to what the First Amendment itself
means in practice,1 48 that is not the relevant issue at stake here. Instead, as
Professor Ringhand noted in discussing earlier campaign finance cases,
"[t]he relevant question," is simply "how aggressively judges should use
their power of judicial review to give substance to ... abstractions in the
face of legislative disagreement about what democracy requires." 49
Unfortunately the Citizens United majority has taken exactly the
wrong approach; instead, "judges should exercise their awesome power of
judicial review modestly, and without assuming, especially without overt
analysis, that their particular views of democracy are constitutionally
compelled." 50 It is only when we evaluate the majority's approach under
the democracy-definition framework that this underlying pattern in the
decision becomes clear. But as we shall see, the decision also appears to be
out of line with what may be a societal majority's understanding of what
makes up an ideal democracy.
3. Lack of Deference to Congress and the Court's Own Institutional
Integrity
The majority in Citizens United went to great lengths to reach a
desired outcome, sweeping aside years of settled case law, statutes, and
some of the Court's own general rules of procedure in the process.151 And
yet there were a long list of more narrow holdings the Court could have
adopted instead to avoid so much legal carnage, while still granting the
144. Id.
145. Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77, 78 (2010).
146. Floyd Abrams, Remembering the First Amendment, THE NATION, Jan 31, 2011,
http://www.thenation.com/article/l57720/debating-citizens-united?page=full.
147. Id.
148. Calabria, supra note 65, at 841.
149. Ringhand, supranote 4, at 114.
150. Id.
151. Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign Finance Reform,
SLATE, Jan. 21, 2010 12:58 PM, http://www.slate.com/id/2242209.
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exact same result to the parties in the case. 152 Instead the Court overturned
part of Congress's laboriously considered work in the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act-to which the Court had previously shown great
deference-as well as overturning its own precedent in McConnell and
Austin. 153 To do so, the majority mostly relied on two cases: Buckley and
Bellotti.154
Starting from a blanket "more speech is good" argument, the majority
took Buckley's animating logic that independent expenditures in 1976
seemed less likely to lead to corruption, and applied it as a legal maxim:
independent expenditures never create corruption.15 5 More ironic is the
majority's distorted use of Bellotti, which held that corporations should be
allowed to participate in referenda due to the absence of candidates to
corrupt, even though they should still be banned from influencing candidate
elections. 156 The Citizens United majority lifted a few isolated passages
from Bellotti to argue that the decision instead stood for the idea that
corporations have broad First Amendment rights to engage in the political
process. 5 7 The majority felt that this shaky ground provided sufficient
footing for it to overturn decades of legislative and judicial precedent.
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the Court's decision in Citizens
United was "backwards in many senses."1 58 He noted that it "elevates the
majority's agenda over the litigants' submissions, facial attacks over as152. Burt Neuborne, Corporations Aren't People, THE NATION, Jan 31, 2011,
http://www.thenation.com/article/l57720/debating-citizens-united?page=full ("The video didn't fall
under the campaign laws because it was necessary to take the affirmative step of downloading it, the
equivalent of taking a book off a library shelf. The need for active collaboration by willing viewers
should have ended the Citizens United case before it got started. In addition, the campaign statute
applied only if 50,000 eligible voters were likely to view the video. How likely was it that 50,000
Democrats would have affirmatively downloaded a hatchet job on Hillary Clinton just before the
primary? Moreover, lower court precedent had already recognized an exemption for electioneering
communications with only tiny amounts of corporate funding, such as the less than 1 percent in Citizens
United. Finally, the Supreme Court had already carved out a First Amendment safe harbor for nonprofit
grassroots groups with de minimis corporate funding.").
153. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (majority).
154. Id. at 958 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
155. Id at 901-03 (majority).
156. Id. at 958-59 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("The majority attempts to explain away the distinction Bellotti drew-between general
corporate speech and campaign speech intended to promote or prevent the election of specific
candidates for office-as inconsistent with the rest of the opinion and with Buckley. . .. Yet the basis for
this distinction is perfectly coherent: The anticorruption interests that animate regulations of corporation
participation in candidate elections. . .do not apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in
referenda. A referendum cannot owe a political debt to a corporation, seek to curry favor with a
corporation, or fear the corporation's retaliation . . .Bellotti, apparently, is both the font of all wisdom
and internally incoherent.").
157. Id. at 958.
158. Id. at 979.
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applied claims, broad constitutional theories over narrow statutory grounds,
individual opinions over precedential holdings, assertion over tradition,
absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality."' 59 But the majority got
five votes.
C. Triggering the Next Round of Campaign Finance Cases
Unfortunately, it appears that the momentum of the Citizens United
decision as precedent may well carry over to help topple other longstanding
campaign finance laws. The Court invoked Buckley to grant de facto
political personhood to corporations for purposes of political
electioneering; thus corporations now may not be barred from directly
paying for independent political expenditures in the days leading up to
primaries and general elections. But this then begs the question of whether
corporations must also be allowed to make direct contributions to
candidates.
Although Buckley upheld restrictions on direct candidate contributions
as necessary to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption, this
simply means that there is a cap on the amount of money a person can
donate to a candidate's campaign.1 60 On the other hand, corporations have
been banned from making any direct contributions to electoral candidates
since 1907 under the Tillman Act. 16 1 In the wake of Citizens United, a U.S.
District Court has now held that this distinction is also unconstitutional.1 62
Even though several other courts have refused to expand on the spirit of
Citizens United to overturn additional campaign finance laws in recent
months,163 it appears that these issues will be litigated in the courts for
years to come, with the sweeping statements in Citizens United serving as a
159. Id.
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35 (1976) (per curiam).
161. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2002).
162. U.S. v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85, 2011 WL 2161794 at **17-18 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2011),
denial of motion to reconsider, 2011 WL 2268063 at **1-2 (June 7, 2011) (clarifying initial opinion);
contra Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162-63 (2003) (holding that a complete ban
on contributions is subject to the same lower standard of review as restrictions on contributions under
Buckley). It is unclear how Citizens United and Beaumont may interact.
163. See In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 413-14, 422-23 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding dismissal
of challenges to FECA caps on direct contributions as well as caps on coordinated expenditures), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct. 1718 (2011); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 31620 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding denial of preliminary injunction on state laws banning corporations from
making coordinated expenditures or direct contributions) reh'g en banc granted and holding vacated
(July 12, 2011); Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Smithson, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1042-46 (S.D.
Iowa 2010) (denying preliminary injunction on state law banning corporations from making direct
contributions); Preston v. Leake, 743 F. Supp. 2d 501, 506-09 (E.D. N.C. 2010) (denying summary
judgment for plaintiff in challenge to state law prohibiting registered lobbyists from making direct
contributions to candidates for state offices).
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springboard for those attempting to overturn even more campaign finance
regulations. Courts should resist these attempts.
III. PROBLEMS GOING FORWARD
The Court's sweeping logic in Citizens United may cause a few
additional problems going forward. Opinion polls seem to show that much
of the public cares about broader types of institutional corruption, signaling
a disconnect with the Court over its vision of an ideal democracy. Also,
even as the Court has made it more difficult to prevent broader types of
corruption from occurring by overturning campaign finance laws, it has
also made it more difficult to prosecute incidents of the same types of
corruption once they do occur. And polls showing a strong negative
reaction to the opinion and its consequences may foreshadow growing
public discontent on campaign finance issues.
A. Public Concern Over Preventinga Broader Concept of "Corruption"
Signals a Disconnectfrom the Court's Vision ofDemocracy
As difficult as it is to generalize about singular public "opinions" and
"beliefs," polls on corruption issues in America generate some strong
conclusions, including what appears to be widespread public concern over
broader types of corruption issues. This may illustrate a disconnect between
society and the Court over what our democracy should look like. Indeed,
public opinion polls reveal very high levels of concern over governmental
corruption.1 64 In fact, "[1]arge percentages of the public state that
corruption in government is either an 'extremely important' or 'very
important' issue to them personally ... [and] polls show that concern about
political corruption remains remarkably stable" over time. 165 However,
while the public seems to be very concerned about corruption in the
abstract, the issue does not score well when pollsters ask respondents to
prioritize their domestic concerns with respect to choosing specific
candidates for office. 166 Some commentators have argued that this type of
finding undermines the idea that the public really cares about corruption at

164. Matthew J. Streb & April K. Clark, The Public and PoliticalCorruption,in CORRUPTION AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 275, 288 (Michael A. Genovese, et al. eds., 2010).
165. Id. at 286-88 ("A 2006 USA Today/Gallup survey found that 83 percent of adults believed
'corruption in Congress' was either a very (39 percent) or somewhat (44 percent) serious issue. Only 17
percent said it was either not too serious (15 percent) or not serious at all (2 percent). . . . [And] attitudes
on this issue have been fairly stable over the past three decades.").
166. Id.
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all.' 67 But it more likely reflects a lack of alternatives-the feeling that a
vote one way or the other will not change anything at all.168 This reinforces
the idea that Americans are worried about institutionalized types of
corruption because "the public sees corruption as being endemic in
government." 69
The American fixation 70 on corruption in government appears to
involve a much broader understanding of corruption than the Court's quid
pro quo conception allows.'17 In this view, corruption can mean
institutional capture by powerful interests, to the point that government
actors may largely ignore other voices in the political process. This
corruption concern has been described as "duplicitious exclusion: . . . the
secretive or deceptive exclusion of those affected by decisions from
influence over those decisions." 72 Conceptualizing corruption in this way
makes better sense of what appears to be a pervasive loss of public trust in
government, as well as the seemingly contradictory polling on corruption
concerns.173
Under this interpretation, many Americans seem to consider
institutional exclusion as a broader type of corruption.174 They may feel
that most people have no real voice in the political process because the
"corrupt" system only caters to powerful interests.17 5 This understanding of
corruption aligns much better with the two longstanding corruption
interests the Court dismissed in Citizens United-the monetary interest and
distortion rationales-than it does with the narrow quid pro quo rationale
that the Court upheld as a valid government interest. 176 This dissonance
may further undermine public faith in the government's democratic
167. See Beth Ann Rosenson, The Effect of Political Reform Measures on Perceptions of
Corruption,8 ELECTION L.J. 31, 42 (2009).
168. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
125, 136 (2010).
169. Streb & Clark, supra note 164, at 294 (In one long-term poll, "[r]oughly half of the
respondents say the country is losing ground compared to only about 10 percent who believe that
government is making progress; these percentages have held remarkably steady since the early
1990s.").
170. Americans are certainly not the only ones who worry about government corruption. See, e.g.,
Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption:A Comparative Analysis of InternationalCorruption Conventions
and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 793, 797 (2001).
171. Warren, supranote 86, at 40.
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 44 ("[L]arge portions of the public seem to be judging the legal conduct of politics as
'corrupt' in a different sense: norms of democratic inclusion are systematically violated owing to the
capture of the political process by organized interests and sectarian agendas at the expense of public
goods and interests and those who are unorganized, less educated, and less wealthy.").
175. Id.
176. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). See also Burke, supra note 33, at 131.
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processes. 17 7 As Justice Stevens noted in the Citizens United dissent, a
"democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members
believe laws are being bought and sold."17 8
The Court's narrow understanding of corruption also has little in
common with current political realities. 179 Politicians take advantage of this
broad view of corruption all the time, labeling their opponents as insiders
who have already been captured by the corrupt system. These same
politicians will also constantly refer to themselves as outsiders, even after
some have spent decades in the supposedly corrupt Washington culture. 180
Furthermore, the Court's lack of interest in making any effort to describe
the real world dimensions of corruption is troubling, and its choice to deal
with such an important public concern so abstractly ultimately hurts its own
credibility.1 8 1
Opinion polls have also revealed increased public concern over
corrupt linkages between corporations and government, especially since the
beginning of the financial crisis in late 2008.182 Although part of the crisis
may be blamed on incompetence in both the financial sector and
government, people may see this calamity as a more fundamental betrayal
"if the failures of oversight were a consequence not simply of
incompetence but also because the institutions of Wall Street exercised an
improper influence over the regulatory structures of government."l 83 The
timing of the Citizens United decision then, coming so soon after the
financial meltdown, and granting even more political access to
corporations, probably could not have been worse. 184 Some commentators
have wondered aloud whether the majority simply got in over its head early
on in the process and then was unable or unwilling to overcome its own
momentum when the full extent of this bad timing became clear.185
177. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 168, at 135; Streb & Clark, supra note 164, at 299 ("Political
corruption could lead to lower political efficacy, which in turn could make people less likely to
participate politically, an essential component to any democracy.").
178. 130 S. Ct. at 964 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
179. Teachout, supra note 10, at 297.
180. Warren, supra note 86, at 41.
181. Teachout, supranote 10, at 298-99.
182. Warren, supra note 86, at 37.
183. Id. at 41.
184. See
It's
the
Inequality, Stupid,
MOTHER
JONES,
March/April
2011,
http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/02/income-inequality-in-america-chart-graph. Although as Justice
Kennedy helpfully points out, "[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption." Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
185. Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive, SLATE, Jan. 25, 2010, 2:09 PM,
http://www.slate.com/id/2242557/pagenum/all/#p2.
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B. New Difficulties in ProsecutingBroader CorruptionConcerns After the
Fact
Now that Citizens United is the law of the land, the government must
decide how to deal with what seem to be broad public corruption
concerns 1 86 in an environment in which the Supreme Court may be
unsympathetic to new campaign finance laws. Although the government
has many punitive corruption regulations, in addition to preventative
measures like campaign finance laws, individual corruption prosecutions
can only do so much.187 And recently in Skilling v. United States, the
Supreme Court overturned one of a prosecutor's most useful punitive
corruption statutes on vagueness concerns.1 88 Although the areas of law at
issue in Skilling and Citizens United are different, the same basic story
plays out in both cases: legislators attempt to target more implicit
corruption issues, and the Supreme Court strikes the law down over
constitutional concerns based on a narrow view of corruption. 189
But punishing only the worst examples of acute corruption while
allowing systematic issues of undue influence to simmer under the radar is
not a real solution to these concerns. 190 And reform measures that target the
appearance of corruption while avoiding underlying causes of corruption
can paradoxically raise perceptions of corruption.19 1 In addition, it is often
extremely difficult to prosecute more nebulous types of corruption after the
fact because of the burden of proving corruption has occurred, as well as
the difficulty in creating statutes to target broader corruption concerns in
the first place. The 10,000-page record in McConnell explains the first
issue, noting that in spite of widespread monetary interest concerns in
Congress, actual proof of corruption only surfaces in the most extreme
cases because more implicit types of corruption are easy to hide. 19 2 And the
result in Skilling illustrates the second problem well.
The Court held in Skilling that the "honest services" wire fraud statute,
a popular tool among prosecutors targeting a broad array of political and
186. Streb & Clark, supranote 164, at 288.
187. See Entin, supranote 13, at 265-7 1.
188. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
189. Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional Battle Over Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest
Services, and the Legislative-JudicialDivide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 364-65 (2011).
190. Warren, supra note 86, at 55 ("[W]hile Blagojevich-style corruption is an ever-present danger
in democracies, we should not allow such cases to distract from more pervasive forms of the corruption
of democratic processes that work via exclusion . ... Although the old-fashioned corruption certainly
does not help democracies, it is likely that corruption as duplicitous exclusion produces the generalized
public judgments that 'the system' is corrupt.").
191. Rosenson, supranote 167, at 42.
192. 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruledin part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
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corporate corruption, only applies to explicit bribery and kickback
schemes.1 93 The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, criminalized acts of a public or
quasi-public official that serve to "deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services."1 94 The Court imposed a limiting restriction to avoid
vagueness concerns, interpreting the statute to cover only a core category
of corruption crimes-which it found to consist of explicit bribery and
kickback schemes-while excluding issues of undue influence and nondisclosure.195

The doctrine of prohibiting the deprivation of the public's intangible
rights had grown out of an earlier version of the mail fraud statute. 196 In
cases where a public official abused governmental power for private gain,
there may not be any party that suffered a corresponding loss; the loss in
such cases may only be the intangible right of the public to be honestly
represented.1 97 Though all Circuits of the Court of Appeals had embraced
this broader theory of fraud,198 the Supreme Court held in McNally v. U.S.
that the original mail fraud statute was instead "limited in scope to the
protection of property rights." 99 Congress quickly reversed the McNally
decision by passing legislation "specifically to cover one of the 'intangible
rights' that lower courts had protected .. . prior to McNally: 'the intangible
right of honest services."' 200 A circuit split then developed over how to
interpret the new "honest services" statute. 20 1
The Skilling Court reasoned that because most honest-services cases
after McNally dealt with explicit bribes and kickbacks, those categories of
corruption formed the core focus of the statute. 202 By limiting the statute to
this core set of crimes, the Court held that it avoided vagueness concerns
by establishing clear notice to potential defendants, because those core
crimes are unambiguously illegal. 203 In noting that the statute had
sometimes been applied to more "amorphous" wrongdoing, the Court
reiterated that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, . . . it must speak more
clearly than it has." 204
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
Id. at 2908 n.1.
Id. at 2931-34.
Id. at 2926.
Id. at 2926-28.
Id. at 2927.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2928 n.36.
Id. at 2928.
Id.
Id. at 2933 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The government had asked the Court to adopt a wider undue influence
standard, but the Court noted that too many questions remained
unanswered for it to adopt such a broad standard, and that a new round of
careful legislative action would instead be required to answer them. 205
Since Skilling, some have called for legislatures to work to find a way to
close "the gap created by this decision," 2 06 and Senator Patrick Leahy
introduced legislation to address some of these concerns. 207 However, it is
unlikely that any such bill could pass in the current political climate. 208
In the meantime, "Skilling has had a 'significant' impact on pending
cases and criminal investigations, and . .. [t]he Department of Justice
(DOJ) already has dropped several active cases." 20 9 Thus, in looking at the
Citizens United and Skilling decisions together, the Court has recently
disabled portions of both preventative and punitive corruption regulations
that target broader types of corruption concerns.
C. Public Grumblings ofDiscontent
Soon after the Citizens United ruling came the public opinion polling,
finding that "Americans of both parties overwhelmingly oppose" the
decision. 2 10 A February 2010 Washington Post/ABC News poll showed
eight out of ten respondents disapproved of the outcome, with 65 percent
"strongly opposed," and 72 percent in favor of restoring the previous
limits. 2 11 As some have noted, it is difficult to make too strong of a
conclusion based on a few polls on such a complex issue, and more data are
needed. 2 12 However, Justice Stevens's closing argument in dissent appears
to ring true: "[w]hile American democracy is imperfect, few outside the
majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of
corporate money in politics." 2 13

205. Id. at 2933 n.44.
206. Stephen P. Younger, Government Ethics Reform: Rebuilding Public Trust in Our Institutions
of Government, 82-DEC N.Y. ST. B.J. 5,5 (2010).
207. Robert Plotkin & Nicholas B. Lewis, Honest-Services Fraudin the Wake of Skilling, 18 No. 4
Bus. CRIMES BULL. 1 (2010).

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign
Financing, WASHINGTON
POST,
Feb.
17,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.
211. Id
212. Mat Sundquist, Imprecise Language and Citizens United Polling, SCOTUSBLOG, Mar. 5,
2010, http://www.scotusblog.com/201 0/03/imprecise-language-and-citizens-united-polling/.
213. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 979 (2010). (Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Since Citizens United was decided, many have proposed new
campaign finance legislation or constitutional amendments to reign in or
overturn the decision outright. 2 14 However, such changes looked unlikely
after even modest disclosure requirements were defeated in the Senate by a
Republican filibuster, 2 15 and now appear out of the question after
significant Republican gains in the 2010 midterm elections. 2 16 Others have
argued that Citizens United will continue to cause a great deal of
uncertainty for courts to interpret as precedent. 2 17 President Obama's
public criticism of the decision in his January 2010 State of the Union
address may even be part of a broader strategy to "run against the Court" in
the 2012 presidential election. 2 18 Nixon similarly positioned himself
against the Warren Court as part of his successful presidential campaign
following the Supreme Court's then-controversial Miranda decision. 2 19 It
seems unlikely that adverse popular opinion will cause the current Court to
simply change its mind anytime soon, and the Court's high levels of
popularity as an institution may make it effectively immune against any
sudden drop in support. 220 In the short term, the path forward is unclear.
In the long term, the issue will be whether the American people can
sustain high levels of disapproval against the ruling, and organize concerted
social pressure against the Court and the political branches to change it.
This is because "[i]t is through the process of judicial responsiveness to
public opinion that the meaning of the Constitution takes shape. The Court
rules. The public responds. Over time ... the Court comes into line with
the considered views of the American public." 22 1 Throughout its history of
constitutional interpretation, the Court has generally moved in broad
channels of popular support, and when decisions have strayed too far from
that support it has often adjusted course over time in response. 222 In the

214. Abrams, supranote 145, at 79.
215. Burt Neubome,
The Censorship
Canard, THE NATION,
Jan
31,
2011,
http://www.thenation.com/article/l57720/debating-citizens-united?page=full.
216. Abrams, supranote 146.
217. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
603-04, 615 (2010-2011).
218. See Richard L. Hasen, Scalia's Retirement Party, SLATE, Apr. 12, 2010, 3:55 PM,
http://www.slate.com/id/2250579/.
219. Id.
220. HASEN, supra note 14, at 10.
221. FRIEDMAN, supra note 138, at 383.
222. Id. at 382 ("What history shows is assuredly not that Supreme Court decisions always are in
line with popular opinion, but rather that they come into line with one another over time.").
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end, the Court must mind decisive, long-term public sentiment because it
requires public confidence to function effectively. 223
The late Justice Rehnquist's answer to the question of whether justices
could "isolate themselves from the pressure of public opinion . .. was that
'we are not able to do so and it would probably be unwise to try."' 224 And
Justice O'Connor has noted that the Court "rel[ies] on the confidence of the
public in the correctness of [its] decisions. That's why we have to be aware
of public opinions and of attitudes toward our system of justice, and it is
why we must try to keep and build that trust." 225 There certainly needs to
be space for principled legal decisions on the meaning of the Constitution.
But while day-to-day public passions should not decide cases, the Court's
decisions historically do not stand the test of time without popular
support. 226
CONCLUSION
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court engaged in its latest, perhaps
most blatant act of democracy definition in a long history of such behavior
in campaign finance cases. The majority's pluralist, interest group-focused
viewpoint on democracy pervades its entire opinion, informing its abstract
conceptualization of broad corporate speech rights and narrow
understanding of the corruption interest as confined to only the quid pro
quo rationale. Corporations now have the right to spend freely to influence
elections, as they did in the 2010 state and congressional elections, and as
they are gearing up to do in the 2012 elections.
Although everyone may have noticed the new influx of attack ads
during the 2010 elections, 22 7 because of the lack of disclosure laws, it is
difficult to tell just how much corporate and union money was spent to
influence the elections, or how much the inclusion of this new source of
223. Id. at 370 (.'No institution .. . can survive the loss of public confidence, particularly when the
people's faith is its only support.' For this reason, the Court has, 'with but few exceptions, adjusted
itself in the long run to the dominant currents of public sentiment."' (quoting DEAN ALFANGE, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL ix, 40, 235 (1937))).

224. Id. at 371 (quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?: Even Liberals May Come to Regard
William Rehnquist as One of the Most Successful Chief Justices of the Century, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
84-86 (Apr. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. at 371 (quoting Sandra Day O'Conner, Public Trust as a Dimension of Equal Justice:
Some Suggestions to Increase Public Trust, 36 CT. REV. 13 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id. at 380-81.
227. Robert Weissman, Citizens United Impact Worse than Anticipated, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 26,
2011, ("Most of the groups were funded by a small number of corporations and superwealthy
individuals .... As completely unaccountable entities, they also were free to run vicious attack ads
without even the reputational harm that attaches to candidates who run negative ads. Virtually everyone
hates attack ads, but they work.").
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money affected the outcomes of those races. 22 8 By some accounts,
Republicans benefited disproportionately and handsomely reaped the
rewards. 2 29 And although the congressional failure to pass disclosure laws
is not directly the fault of the Citizens United decision, 230 the waves of
representatives voted in with the help of corporate influence make it even
less likely that Congress will approve disclosure laws going forward. 231
What is clear is that income disparities are dramatically on the rise in
America 232-with a vast number of Americans now living below the
poverty line 233-while at the same time, the rich have increasingly come to
dominate the political process. 234 Now the Supreme Court has allowed
corporations to join in as well. But in the end, "[t]he decisions of the
justices on the meaning of the Constitution must be ratified by the
American people." 235 The question is what the people will choose to do
about all of this.

228. Neuborne, supranote 152.
229. Weissman, supra note 227 ("With inadequate reporting and disclosure rules, we don't know
exactly who spent what in the election. We do know that 150 organizations outside of the political
parties reported spending nearly $300 million to influence federal elections, and that the actual number
is much higher. Outside groups' spending favored Republicans by about 2-to-I.").
230. Abrams, supra note 146 ("Congress has never required such disclosure. It could still do so, but
if it doesn't, don't blame Citizens United.").
231. See Neubome, supranote 215.
232. The Rich and the Rest, THE ECONOMIST 13, Jan. 22, 2011 ("The gap between rich and poor
has risen ... especially [in] America[;] . . . the shift has been overwhelmingly due to a rise in the share
of income going to the very top-the highest 1%of earners and above-particularly those working in
the financial sector. Many Americans are seeing their living standards stagnate, but the gap between
most of them has not changed all that much.").
233. Sabrina Taverise, Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on Lost Decade, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/14census.html?_r-2&hp.
234. Teachout, supra note 10, at 321 ("The [Court] ... has rendered the richest people in the
country the first-level 'gatekeepers' in deciding who can run for public office.").
235. FRIEDMAN, supra note 138, at 381 ("What matters most about judicial review, however, is not
the Supreme Court's role in the process, but how the public reacts to those decisions. This is the most
important lesson that history teaches. Almost everything consequential about judicial review occurs
after the judges rule, not when they do.").

